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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDING
A complete list of all parties to this
proceeding in the lower court is contained in the caption
of the case upon appeal with the exception of Summit
County.

Summit County was originally a defendant.

The

complaint against Summit County was voluntarily dismissed
by the plaintiff prior to trial.
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Supreme Court

The lower court designated its holding that the Edward L,
Gillmorfs claims are barred by "traditional notions of
finality" as a finding of fact. The holding is in
reality a conclusion of law ai id this court should not
accord it any added deference simply because it was
denominated a finding of Fact. State v. Rio Vista
C\],
Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990)

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989).
3.

Did the trial court err in holding as a

matter of law that Charles F. Gillmor was not entitled to an
easement by necessity over the Sawmill Canyon Road across
property owned by Shirley Gillmor?

The court held this claim

was barred by "traditional notions of finality inherent in
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel."
(R. 885). The court's holding was a conclusion of law and
this court need accord it no deference but should review it
for correctness.

Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179

(Utah 1989).
4.

Was trial court's finding that the trial

court in the Partition Action "did not intend to provide
Charles F. Gillmor and Edward Gillmor access over parcels
awarded to Florence Gillmor" (Finding of Fact No. 28, R.
884) clearly erroneous as against the weight of the evidence?
This is a question of fact, the standard of review for which
allows reversal if the finding is clearly erroneous and
against the clear weight of the evidence.

Doelle v.

Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); Rule 52(a),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
5.

Did the trial court err in refusing to

reform or correct the description of the Sawmill Canyon
Road in the Partition Decree on the grounds of mutual
mistake?

This issue involves mixed questions of fact

and law.

The issue of fact is whether the trial court in

the Partition Action intended to deny Edward L. Gillmor and
-2-
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Nature of the Case
T
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t lie Wright defendants seeking to establish a private easemen
across defendants' property for bi g game hunters to whom
3-

hunting permits had been sold as part of a commercial
hunting operation.

Subsequent to the action being filed

Charles F. Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor intervened as
defendants in the litigation and in their counterclaims
sought an award of an easement over the Sawmill Canyon Road
where it crosses plaintiff's property.
B.

Disposition of the Case Below
In September 1986 Judge Judith Billings heard

plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order to enjoin
defendants Wright from interference with plaintiff's use of
the road.
denied.

After a day of testimony plaintiff's motion was
In September 1987 a hearing was held before Judge

Homer F. Wilkinson.

Plaintiff's motion for preliminary

injunction, after another day of testimony, was denied.
Judge Wilkinson ruled that plaintiff had a right to use the
Sawmill Canyon Road for any purpose for which it was lawfully
used prior to its abandonment by Summit County in December
1986.

(Tr. 9/25/87, page 252).

The judge ruled that such

legal use did not include hunting by permitees because the
practice violated the Summit County zoning ordinances.
(Tr. 9/25/87, page 253).

2.

To remain consistent with other parties herein references
references to transcripts will be as follows:
the hearing on plaintiff's motion for
temporary restraining order will be "Tr. 9/30/86"; the
hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction
will be "Tr. 9/25/87"; the hearing on plaintiff's motion
to amend judgment will be "Tr. 9/30/87"; and the trial
will be "Tr. 9/20/88"
-4-
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Judicial District Court of Summit County in the matter of
Olsen v. Papadopulos.

(Findings of Fact, NO. 9).

The Wright property, the Gillmor Sawmill
Property and the Sawmill Canyon Road have been used
historically only for domestic livestock purposes.

(Tr.

9/30/86, pages 5,19,20-21-69,80,117-118; Tr. 9/25/87 pages
30,61,156,203 and 220).
Prior to 1963 plaintiff had no involvement
with the Gillmor Sawmill Property.

(Tr. 9/30/86, page 8).

In 1963 a contractor (Dean Geary) was
employed to "open up" the Sawmill Canyon Road so that the
Gillmor's would have access to a spring on the Gillmor
Sawmill property for livestock purposes.
included the development of the spring.

Geary's work
Some of Geary's

work in 1963 was performed on the Wright property.

(Tr.

9/30/86, pages 8, 17, 121, 122 and 130). Subsequently, in
1982 and 1983 a contractor known as Mills repaired a washout
in the road on the Gillmor Sawmill property and performed
some minor work on the Wright property.

In 1984 or 1985

Wright employed Geary to repair the road upon the Wright
property and paid him for those repairs.

(Tr. 9/30/86 page

82) .
Before Geary performed the work on the road
in 1963 the roadway only went to the corrals located on the
Wright property, and from that point on (i.e., across the
Gillmor Sawmill Property) the road was only a horse trail
that was not passable by vehicular traffic.
-6-

(Tr. 9/30/86

pages 9 and 68).
Passage along the Sawmill Canyon Road has
always been obstructed by a locked gate constructed upon the
Wright property—i.e., the Wright gate.

The locked gate has

been maintained by the Wrights, both before and after the
development of the road by Geary in 1963.

(Tr. 9/30/86,

pages 10, 27-28 and 29; Tr. 9/27/87, pages 63, 151). Dennis
Wright could never remember a time when a locked gate was not
maintained by his family, even as early as 1953 when he was
a young boy.

(Tr. 9/30/86, page 70).

Only the Wrights and

the Gillmors had access to the padlock.

(id.)

Bud Gillmor,

who was aware of the Sawmill area all of his life and is now
61 years old, could not remember a time when a locked gate
was note maintained by the Wrights.
119).

(Tr. 9/30/86, page

As a courtesy, Dennis Wright gave intervenor-

defendants and Florence Gillmor the combination to the lock
on the Wright gate so they could have access across his
property solely for livestock purposes.

(Tr. 9/30/86,

pages 79-80).
Before development of the road began in 1963
plaintiff obtained a key from Dennis Wright's father,
Lawrence Wright to gain access through the Wright gate.
Plaintiff told Lawrence Wright that Gillmors were building
the road for use in their livestock operations.

(Tr.9/30/86,

pages 10 and 17). Plaintiff never told Lawrence Wright
that the road was being constructed for any other purpose
including the development of hunting in the area.
-7-

(Tr.

9/30/86, page 18).
After the development of the road in 1963 the
road was maintained by the Gillmors for livestock operations.
(Tr. 9/30/86, pages 11 and 21).
Plaintiff conducted no commercial hunting
until 1982 when plaintiff sold private permits to
approximately 20 hunters that plaintiff took to the
Gillmor Sawmill Property for hunting.

(Tr. 9/30/86, pages

13-14 and 42 and Tr. 9/27/87, pages 31-32).

They gained

access to the Gillmor Sawmill Property across the Wright's
property (via Sawmill Canyon Road) and set up camp on the
Sawmill property of Charles F. Gillmor.

They took in trucks

and other vehicles, including horse trailers.

(Tr. 9/30/86,

pages 43, 57 and 75).
According to plaintiff, he traversed the
Wright property in 1982 for commercial hunting activities
without seeking the Wrights' permission to use the road for
hunting purposes.

Plaintiff claims that, without

explanation, he asked for and obtained the key to the
Wrights' age without advising them he was selling hunting
permits.

(Tr. 9/30/86, pages 27-28).

According to Dennis

Wright, plaintiff did request his permission, which Mr.
Wright denied.

Despite Mr. Wright's refusal, plaintiff

traversed across the Wright property the very next day.
(Tr. 9/30/86, pages 57 and 73-75).

Wright subsequently

told plaintiff or his agents that he disapproved of what
plaintiff had done.

(]A).
-8-

In 1983 plaintiff again requested Mr.
Wright's permission, which was refused. Nevertheless,
plaintiff traversed the Wright property (although not
along the roadway) on horseback to gain access to the
Gillmor Sawmill Property to conduct his hunting operation.
(Tr. 9/30/86, pages 75-77 and Tr. 9/27/87, page 34).
Eddison Stephens, an employee of plaintiff, who managed
plaintifffs hunting operation, removed the lock from
the Wright gate in 1983. Mr. Wright promptly replaced
the lock.

(Tr. 9/30/86, page 77).
In 1984 plaintiff again requested Mr.

Wright's permission, which again was refused.

(Tr. 9/30/86

pages 13-14, 33, 57 and 85). In 1984 plaintiff gained
access to the Gillmor Sawmill Property from across state
lands and did not use the roadway across the Wright
property.

(Tr. 9/30/86, page 34).
In 1985 the plaintiff gained access to the

Gillmor Sawmill Property for his hunting operations by
crossing the property of another landowner.

(Tr. 9/30/86,

pages 35 and 46).
Dennis Wright never gave permission to
anyone to cross his property between 1982 and 1985 for
the purpose of hunting on the Gillmor Sawmill Property, and
when requested, denied permission.

(Tr. 9/30/86, pages

86-76).
Wright has never given permission to the
Gillmors to use the Sawmill Canyon Road across his
-9-

property for any purpose other than an agricultural one.
( Tr. 9/30/86, page 80).
In 1986 permits were sold and defendant
Dennis Wright refused Steve Gillmor access to Gillmor
land across Sawmill Canyon Road.

(Tr. 9/27/87, pages

36,37 and 38).
In 1987 Steve Gillmor built a cabin on
property he had acquired from Florence Gillmor.
purposes for this cabin was to house hunters.

One of the
(Tr. 9/27/

87, page 45). Prior to beginning construction Steve
Gillmor did not obtain a building permit but subsequently
went to Summit County and applied for a building permit.
(Tr. 9/27/87, page 85).
At the time Steve Gillmor applied for the
building permit he advised the Director of the Summit
County Planning and Building Department (the person who
issues building permits) that the cabin would be used
primarily for a cabin and not for commercial use.

(Tr.

9/27/87, page 193). Steve Gillmor assured the Director
the cabin would not be used for commercial hunting and the
Director informed Steve Gillmor that use of the cabin for
commercial hunting would not be a permitted use of the
cabin under current zoning classification for the
property.

(Tr. 9/27/87, page 193). The Director inserted

language on the building permit issued to Steve Gillmor
stating "cabin is for seasonal residential use—not
commercial use (hunting lodge)".
-10-

(Tr. 9/27/87, pages

194 and 199). The Director further discussed with
Steve Gillmor that if the building was going to be used
as a hunting lodge, that he would have to file an
application for a conditional use permit which Steve
Gillmor did.

(Tr. 9/27/87, page 195).
The Director of the Summit Planning and

Building Department testified that a commercial hunting
lodge or hunting use is not a permitted use in an
agricultural grazing zone.
use permit.

It is by special conditional

He further testified that the property in

question would not allow a commercial hunting operation
without a conditional use permit being granted.

(Tr. 9/27/87

pages 196-197).
The Gillmor family, for many years prior to
December, 1986, used the Sawmill Canyon road to obtain
access to their property for themselves, their employees
and their guests to transport and tend livestock, to
perform maintenance or construct improvements on the
property, and for big game hunting by the family, employees
and guests, but not including access for persons holding
permits from the landowners to hunt big game.

The road

has historically carried a variety of vehicles including
trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational
vehicles, and has been travelled by persons on foot and
on horseback.

(Findings of Fact No. 10).
-11-

At various times during the years 1982
through 1986, Stephen Gillmor was unable to transport
hunters over the Sawmill Canyon Road because he was
stopped from doing so by defendant Dennis Wright, who
maintained that Stephen Gillmor did not have the right
to transport paying hunters across the Wright property
using the Sawmill Canyon Road.

(Findings of Fact No. 12)

In 1986 Stephen Gillmor discovered the
decision in Olsen v. Papadopulos and presented it to
Dennis Wright, who thereupon temporarily ceased his interference with Stephen Gillmor1s use of the road.

(Findings

of Fact No. 13)
On December 24, 1986 at the request of
defendants Wright, the Summit County Commission formally
abandoned the Sawmill Canyon Road as a public road whereupon
defendant Dennis Wright reiterated the position of defendants
Wright that Stephen Gillmor could no longer use the Sawmill
Canyon Road to transport paying hunters across the Wright
property.

(Findings of Fact No. 14)
The Gillmor Sawmill property has been

designated by Summit County as Agriculture-Grazing (AG-1)
Zone.

(Findings of Fact No. 16)
The sale of big game permits by Stephen

Gillmor and hunting pursuant to such permits, without a
conditional use permit having been issued, was not a lawful
-12-

use of the Sawmill Property during the years 1982 through
1986 because such activities violated the AG-1 Zoning
ordinance.

(Findings of Fact No. 17)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff as an abutting landowner retains the

right to use an abandoned public road for any purpose for
which it was lawfully used prior to its abandonment.
Plaintiff is not entitled to use the Sawmill Canyon Road
for access by paying hunters as part of a commercial hunting
operation because such use was not a lawful use at the time
of abandonment of the public road.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFF
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO USE THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD FOR ACCESS BY
PAYING HUNTERS AS PART OF A COMMERCIAL HUNTING OPERATION
SINCE SUCH USE WAS NOT A LAWFUL USE AT THE TIME OF THE
ABANDONMENT OF SUCH PUBLIC ROAD.
As a general rule, once a public roadway is
abandoned, abutting land owners have the right to have the
roadway kept open as a "thoroughfare to the entire
community."
(Tenn. 1958).

See, Pashall v. Valentine, 321 S.W. 2d 568
Although Utah follows the general rule with

respect to the creation of an easement for abutting land
owners upon the abandonment of a public road, the Utah
Supreme Court has expressly limited the extent of the use of
the resulting easement.
Elevator Company, 107 P.

In Hague v. Juab County Mill &
249 (Utah 1910), the Utah Supreme

Court was asked to enjoin the maintenance of a water flume
adjacent to the plaintifffs property, which the plaintiff

claimed interfered with his easement in a public street
that had been abandoned.

After noting that an abutting

land owner retained a private easement as a result of the
abandonment, the Hague court also noted that the resulting
easement was limited to the historic use that the plaintiff
had made of the road:
"Respondent's legal right to a reasonably
convenient passageway from his premises to
the street certainly cannot be questioned nor
interfered with by appellant. Nor can
respondent prevent appellant from using the
channel for the purposes for which it was
constructed and used prior to the commencement of the action. /The extent of the
appellant's rights, however, in fluming and
maintaining said channel are not unlimited.
If the banks or sides of the channel were
maintained in the street at a certain width
and height during all of the years the
channel had been used by the appellant, it
may not, for its own convenience, change the
channel, if such change interferes with the
rights of others. (Id. at 251 emphasis
added.)
In the subsequent case of Mason v. State/
656 P.2d 465 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court again
addressed the extent of an easement resulting from an
abandonment.

In Mason, a public highway had been abandoned

by the state and the plaintiff, an abutting land owner, had
been told that if he did not purchase the strip of land it
would be sold to a third person.

The plaintiff purchased the

property under protest and thereafter sought a return of the
money he paid.

In discussing the extent of the plaintiff's

use of the strip of land, the Utah Supreme Court noted that
in Hague an abutting land owner had an easement and concluded
-1
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that the abutting land owner's use of the resulting easement
was limited to providing only reasonable ingress and egress
to the property:
"Our interpretation of the abutting land
owner's easement of access as being subject
to precedent requirements of reasonableness
in the circumstances accords with what we
consider the better-reasoned opinions on
this subject... The property owner's right
to preserve the status quo on access to and
over abutting highways must be qualified by
the public interest in relocating public
highways for greater advantage at minimum
possible cost and in facilitating in the
return of land to productive purposes. Thus,
the abutting property owner has an easement
over the abandoned highway only where (and to
the extent that) it is 'necessary for ingress
and egress ' ".. . (Id. at 469 citations omitted
and emphasis added"!"".
As a result, the use of the private easement
over the Sawmill Canyon Road remaining for the abutting land
owners, including Shirley Gillmor, is limited to only
reasonable ingress and egress to the respective properties.
That limited use must be construed in accordance with the
historic use of the roadway during all of the years that it
was a public road.

The record is unequivocal that the

Sawmill Canyon Road has historically been used only for
purposes associated with domestic grazing and not for
commercial hunting activities.
Further, commercial hunting activities do not
constitute activities directly associated with use of the
Sawmill Canyon Road for ingress and egress.

On the contrary,

such activities represent a broad expansion of such rights,
-15-

and are inconsistent with the historical and present and
continuing use of the Wright property and the Gillmor Sawmill
property and the Sawmill Canyon road for domestic livestock
purposes.

Shirley Gillmorfs commercial hunting activities

would substantially burden the estates of Wright, Charles
F. Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor beyond the rights of
reasonable ingress and egress allowed by Hague and Mason
and would require the defendants to alter substantially the
use of their properties for domestic livestock purposes.
This court should not allow Shirley Gillmor to broaden the
historical use of the Sawmill Canyon Road so that she can
profit from the commercial killing of wild animals while
substantially altering and burdening the use of defendants1
properties.
The record is clear that the property in
question is zoned AG-1 and that commercial hunting is not
permitted in such zone.

(Tr. 9/27/87, pages 193-199).

Judge Wilkinson (Tr. 9/27/87, pages 252-254) and Judge
Murphy (Findings of Fact No. 17)(Conclusions of Law No. 3)
ruled that permitting paying hunters to use the Gillmor
Sawmill property for commercial hunting purposes was a
violation of the Summit County Zoning Ordinances and
therefore was not a lawful use of the property.
Both judges additionally ruled (Tr. 9/28/87
pages 252-2540)(Conclusions of Law No. 13) that abutting
land owners retain the right to use a road for any purpose
-16-

for which it was lawfully (emphasis added) used prior to
abandonment.

(Tr. 9/27/87, pages 252-254)(Conclusions of

Law Nos. 1 and 3).
The use of the Sawmill Canyon Road by paying
hunters as part of a commercial hunting operation would
clearly be a violation of the Summit County Zoning Ordinances
and therefore would not be a lawful use of such road.
Shirley Gillmor would have this court rule that she is
permitted to use the Sawmill Canyon road for any purpose
she wants even if such purpose is illegal.

Cross-appellants

submit Shirley Gillmor is entitled to use such road only
to the extent such use can be historically established
and then only to the extent that such historical use is
found to be lawful.
CONCLUSION
Dennis Wright, Sara Wright, David Wright, Rona
Wright, Charles F. Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor request this
court to affirm the lower court's judgment and finding
that Shirley Gillmor is not entitled to use the Sawmill
Canyon Road for access by paying hunters because use of the
Gillmor Sawmill property for hunting by persons who have
purchased permits was in violation of the AG Zoning Ordinance
and would therefore not be a lawful use of the property.
DATED this

//^day of January, 1991.

&

f D. GILBERT ATHAY
Lawyer for Cross Appellants Wright
and Charles F. Gillmor
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of
the above and foregoing to:
Mr. James B. Lee
Mr. John B. Wilson
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant, Shirley Gillmor
185 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah
Mr. Richard C. Skeen
Mr. R. Stephen Marshall
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Cross Appellant,
Edward L. Gillmor
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
this l()th day of January, 1990.
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ADDENDUM

Tab A
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TabB

JAMES B. LEE (A1919)
JOHN B. WILSON (A3511)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

SHIRLEY GILLMOR, as personal
representative of the estate
of Stephen T. Gillmor,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

)

DENNIS K. WRIGHT, SARA C.
WRIGHT, DAVID L. WRIGHT, RONA
R. WRIGHT,
Defendants,

)
)
)
)

and

)

CHARLES F. GILLMOR,
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR,

)
)

Intervenor-Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 9067

Judge Michael R. Murphy

)

* * * * * * * *

This matter came on for trial to the Court, Honorable
Michael R. Murphy presiding, on September 20 and 21, 1988.
matter had earlier

come on

for

evidentiary

hearings

This

before

Honorable Judith M. Billings on plaintiff's motion for temporary
restraining order, September 30, 1986, and before Honorable Homer

Wilkinson

on

plaintiff's

September 25, 1987.
trial

and

represented

represented

by

Intervenor-defendant

for

preliminary

injunction,

Plaintiff Shirley Gillmor was
by James

Parsons, Behle & Latimer.
and

motion

D.

present at

B. Lee and John B. Wilson of

Defendant Dennis K. Wright was present
Gilbert

Edward

Athay

Leslie

of

Athay

Gillmor

&

was

Associates.
present

and

represented by R. Stephen Marshall of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall &
McCarthy.

Intervenor-defendant Charles F. Gillmor was present

and represented by D. Gilbert Athay of Athay & Associates.

The

Court observed and heard the testimony of the witnesses, reviewed
the exhibits submitted

by the parties, and reviewed the trial

memoranda submitted by the parties.

The Court reviewed portions

designated by the parties of the transcripts of the hearings on
plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, plaintiff's
motion for preliminary injunction and plaintiff's motion to amend
the judgment on her motion for preliminary injunction.

The Court

reviewed selected transcripts designated by the parties from the
trial of the "partition case", Edward Leslie Gillmor, et al., v.
Florence Gillmor, et al. , Salt Lake County Third District Civil
No. 223998, as well as selected exhibits from the partition case
and the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court on the appeal of the
same case, reported

at 657 P.2d

736

(Utah

1982).

The

Court

travelled in a vehicle the length of the Sawmill Canyon road from
the 1-80 frontage road to the property of Shirley Gillmor.
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The

Court continued in a vehicle to the southeast portion of the
Sawmill property owned by Shirley Gillmor.
length of Pine Canyon.

The Court walked the

The Court viewed each end of 35 Canyon.

The Court, being fully advised in the premises, and
good cause appearing therefor, now hereby makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Shirley Gillmor is the owner of certain

real property located in Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows:
The south 112.0 acres of Section 21, the
south 112.0 acres of Section 22, the south
111.0 acres of that portion of Section 23
owned by Gillmors, the north 316.4 6 acres of
Section 26, the north 316.46 acres of Section
27, the north 316.54 acres of Section 28 less
the northeast quarter of the northeast
quarter, total net 276.46 acres, and the
southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of
Sections 30, T4N, R5E, SLB&M.
Contains
1284.58 acres.
•

•

•

The north 528 acres of Section 21, the
north 528 acres of Section 22, the north 229
acres of that portion of Section 23 owned by
Gillmors, T4N, R5W, SLB&M.
Contains 1285
acres.
The property owned by Shirley Gillmor as described herein is the
northern one-half of a larger parcel of property commonly known
as the "Gillmor Sawmill Property".
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2.

Intervenor-defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor is the

owner of a portion of the Gillmor Sawmill Property located in
Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows:
The south 323.54 acres of Section 26,
the south 323.54 acres of Section 27, the
south 323.54 acres of Section 28, the north
63 acres of the east half of Section 33, the
north 125.49 acres of Section 34 and the
north 125.51 acres of Section 35, T4N, R5E,
SLB&M. Contains 1284.62 acres.
3.

Intervenor-defendant

Charles

F.

Gillmor

is

the

owner of a portion of the Gillmor Sawmill Property located

in

Summit County, Utah and more particularly described as follows:
The south 257 acres of the east half of
Section 33 and the south 513.75 acres of
Section 34 and the south 514.50 acres of
Section 35, less .73 acre reserved to State
Road Commission of T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains
1284.50 acres.
4.

Defendants Dennis K. Wright, Sara C. Wright, David

L. Wright and Rona R. Wright are owners of certain real property
located in Sections 3 and 10, R5E, T3N, SLB&M, Summit County,
Utah.
5.

The Sawmill Canyon Road, as described by the Third

Judicial District Court of Summit County in the matter of Olsen
v. Papadopulos, begins at the frontage road to Interstate 80 in
Echo Canyon in Section 10, Range 5 East, Township 3 North, SLB&M,
and proceeds in a generally northerly direction crossing consecutively the property of the Wright defendants, Charles F. Gillmor,
Edward Leslie Gillmor and terminating on the property owned by
-4-

Shirley Gillmor at a point commonly known as "the forks" located
in Section 28, R5E, T4N, SLB&M.
drive

vehicle

from the

forks

There is access by four-wheel

to

the eastern

portions

of

the

Gillmor Sawmill Property by dirt roads.
6.

The Sawmill Canyon Road is a single lane dirt road

located in the bottom of Sawmill Canyon.
7.

The Gillmor Sawmill Property was at one time owned

in common by Florence Gillmor, Edward Leslie Gillmor and Charles
Frank Gillmor,

It was

partitioned

Judicial District Court dated
223998.

by an order of the Third

February

14, 1981

in Civil No.

The partition decision was affirmed on appeal by the

Utah Supreme Court in its opinion, Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P. 2d
736 (Utah 1982) .
8.

The

property

awarded

to

Florence

Gillmor

was

subsequently conveyed over time to Stephen T. Gillmor and/or his
wife, Shirley Gillmor.

Stephen T. Gillmor passed away in Febru-

ary, 1988 and, as of the trial of this action, the portion of the
Sawmill Property awarded to Florence Gillmor was owned by Shirley
Gillmor

and

Shirley

Gillmor

has been

substituted

for

Stephen

Gillmor as the plaintiff.
9.

Between September,

1943 and December,

1986, the

Sawmill Canyon Road was a public road, having been declared to be
5uch in 1943 by the decision of the Third Judicial District Court
>f Summit County in the matter of Olsen v. Papadopulos.
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10.

The

Gillmor

family,

for

many

years

prior

to

December, 1986, used the Sawmill Canyon Road to obtain access to
their property for themselves, their employees and their guests
to

transport

and

tend

livestock,

to

perform

maintenance

or

construct improvements on the property, and for big game hunting
by the family, employees and guests, but not including access for
persons holding permits

from the landowners to hunt big game.

The road has historically carried a variety of vehicles including
trucks, sheep camps, heavy equipment and recreational vehicles,
and has been travelled by persons on foot and on horseback.
11.

During

the

years

1982

through

1986,

Stephen

Gillmor sold permits to allow persons to hunt big game on the
Gillmor Sawmill Property awarded to Florence Gillmor, and some of
those persons to whom permits were sold travelled in trucks to
the Florence Gillmor Sawmill Property on the Sawmill Canyon Road
and hunted big game there.
12.

At various

times

during

the years

1982

through

1986, Stephen Gillmor was unable to transport hunters over the
Sawmill

Canyon

Road

because

he was

stopped

from doing

so by

defendant Dennis Wright, who maintained that Stephen Gillmor did
not have the right to transport paying hunters across the Wright
property using the Sawmill Canyon Road,
13.

In 1986, Stephen Gillmor discovered the decision

in Olsen v. Papadopulos and presented it to Dennis Wright, who
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thereupon

temporarily

ceased

his

interference

with

Stephen

Gillmor's use of the road.
14.

On December 24, 1986, at the request of the Wright

defendants, the Summit County Commission formally abandoned the
Sawmill Canyon Road as a public road whereupon defendant Dennis
Wright

reiterated

the

position

of

the Wright defendants

that

Stephen Gillmor could no longer use the Sawmill Canyon Road to
transport paying hunters across the Wright property.
15.

From 1982 through 1986, Stephen Gillmor used the

Sawmill Canyon Road for access for his paying big game hunters,
and would have used the road for such purpose on more occasions,
but for the interference by Dennis Wright.
16.

The Gillmor Sawmill property has been designated

by Summit County as Agriculture-Grazing (AG-1) Zone.
17.

The sale of big game permits by Stephen Gillmor

and hunting pursuant to such permits, without a conditional use
permit having been issued, was not a lawful use of the Sawmill
Property during the years 1982 through 1986 because such activities violated the AG-1 zoning ordinance.
18.

While

there

was

some

minimal

evidence

of

road

damage by hunters, there is realistically no difference in the
nature of the use of the road itself, whether the ultimate use of
the various parcels is for commercial hunting, grazing or both.
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19.

There was also some minimal evidence that hunters

are bothersome at times to ranchers, cattle and sheep, but there
was no sufficient showing that hunters' use of the road interfered with the abutting owners' use of or access to their land.
20.

Plaintiff suffered damages of $10,943 dollars in

revenues lost as a direct result of defendant Dennis Wright's
interference with Stephen Gillmor's use of the Sawmill Canyon
Road for access by hunters.
21.

Plaintiff and his agents, servants and hunters did

not trespass upon property belonging to Charles Gillmor or Edward
L. Gillmor.
22.

Plaintiff Stephen T. Gillmor and his agents and

hunters did not create a nuisance.
23.

Plaintiff was not unjustly enriched by the conduct

of hunting operations.
24.

In its opinion on the appeal of the partition

case, the Utah

Supreme Court

ruled that historical

uses of

property are not sacrosanct and that Edward Gillmor's ranching
activities

would

be

affected

and curtailed

and

that

it was

appropriate that preservation of suitable grazing lands not be
the primary consideration of the partitioning court and that the
land as partitioned may be less useable for grazing.
25.

Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor do not have

traditional grazing access to eastern portions of their Sawmill
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parcels unless they are allowed access over parcels awarded to
Florence Gillmor and now owned by Shirley Gillmor.
26.

Thirty-Five Canyon is not accessible for grazing

from the south.
to eastern

Consequently, access over intervenors* own land

portions

must

be

through

Pine

Canyon.

Stock

in

limited numbers and in single file can be moved from the Sawmill
Canyon Road through Pine Canyon

to the eastern

Moving the stock back down Pine Canyon
difficult

and treacherous.

grazing

area.

is even more limited,

Herding stock through Pine Canyon

then does not constitute traditional grazing access.

This is

consistent with the testimony of Richard Huffman in the second
partition trial.

Mr. Huffman did not even consider Pine Canyon

for access.
27.

Earthmoving equipment cannot create a stock trail

through Pine Canyon for traditional grazing access.

The evidence

did establish, however, that as many as 150 head of cattle can be
moved the length of Sawmill Canyon Road over plaintiff's parcels
to the eastern portions of intervenor's parcels in less than a
full day.
28.

The trial court in the partition action did not

intend to provide Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor access over
parcels awarded to Florence Gillmor.
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29.

The difficulty of access to the eastern portions

of the Charles Gillmor and Edward Gillmor parcels was addressed
in testimony in the partition case.
30-

The

source

of

the

"mistake"

in

the

partition

decision alleged by Charles Gillmor and Edward Gillmor is Exhibit
46-D

(Exhibit

113D in the partition case).

Exhibit

offered in the partition case by Charles Gillmor.

46-D was

Edward Gillmor

failed to review Exhibit 46-D in the partition case and to move
to strike it as he was expressly cautioned by the Court to do.
31.

Under such circumstances, it would be inappropri-

ate and unwise to invoke the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(7)
to grant relief from the final judgment.

This is a case where

the finality of the judgment should not be undermined over eight
years

after

response

to

its entry
assertions

and

six years

which

suggest

after
at

its

the

affirmance

most,

in

"mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect".
32.

An order granting an easement by implication or

necessity would violate traditional notions of finality inherent
in the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Based upon the foregoing

findings of fact, the Court

now hereby makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Sawmill Canyon Road was a public road

until

its abandonment by Summit County on December 24, 198.6, following
-10-

which the Sawmill Canyon Road was a private road.

Plaintiff, as

an abutting landowner, retained a right to use the road for any
purpose for which it was lawfully used prior to abandonment in
December, 1986.
2.

Plaintiff

is entitled to use the Sawmill Canyon

Road for access for herself, her family, agents, servants and
guests

for

purposes

related

to

the

conduct

of

her

ranching

operation, for improvement or maintenance of the property, for
recreation and similar uses consistent with the use of the road
prior to December, 1986.

Canyon

3.

Plaintiff

Road

for access

is

not

entitled

by paying

hunters

to

use

the

because

Sawmill

use of the

Gillmor Sawmill Property for hunting by persons who had purchased
permits, without a conditional use permit having been issued, was
in violation of the AG-1 zoning ordinance and would, therefore,
not be a lawful use of the property.
4.

Defendants are not liable for interfering with the

use of the Sawmill Canyon Road by plaintiff for access by paying
hunters.
5.

Plaintiff

is

not

entitled

to

an

injunction

to

prevent interference by the Wright defendants with the use of the
Sawmill Canyon Road for access by paying hunters.
6.

Charles F. Gillmor and Edward Leslie Gillmor are

not entitled to modify the Decree of Partition in the partition
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case, Civil No. 223998, to allow themselves access to their own
Sawmill

parcels

by

crossing

plaintiff's

parcel,

nor

are

intervenor-defendants entitled to an easement by implication or
necessity for such purpose.
7.

Plaintiff is not liable to intervenor-defendants

for trespass, nuisance, unjust enrichment or accounting.
8.

Plaintiffs

complaint,

as

amended,

should

be

dismissed with prejudice.
9.

The counterclaims of the intervenor-defendants, as

amended, should be dismissed with prejudice.
10.

No costs are awarded.

ENTERED this
" ' ' )'
7-day of

MnnJ , 1989

BY THE COURT:

/</

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Dated:
JAMES B. LEE
JOHN B»_J«LS0N
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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B~

XX-^9

Dated:
D. GILBERT ATHAY
ATHAY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Wright Defendants
and Charles F. Gillmor

R. STEPHEN MARSHALL
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
Attorneys for Edward Leslie
Gillmor
219:011989A
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Agriculture-Grazing Zone (AC-1)
(1) Purpose. The AG-1 Agriculture-Grazing Zone is established to lesser,
the danger of fire and floods, particularly in critical watersheds and in
areas of high water tables, and to protect land for agriculture, raising
of livestock, and production of timber. Other objectives in establishing
the zone are: (1) to protect the water supply, the soils, the natural flo
and fauna, and other natural resources within the zone; (2) to protect and
promote scenic values; (3) to avoid excessive costs for public services
which result from the wide scattering of residences; and (4) to provide and
ensure the preservation of wildlife, especially in mountainous terrain.
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by mountains, valleys,
uneven terrain covered with easily combustible vegetation and drainage
areas considered to be unsafe for dwelling purposes.
(3)

Lot Requirements for Building Purposes.

(4)

Authorized Uses.

(5)

Special Provisions.

See Section 12.19.

See Section 12.20.

(a) Vegetative Clearance. All high flammable vegetation shall be
removed from the area surrounding flammable buildings. Extent of the
removal required shall be determined by the Zoning Administrator. Ir.
case of dispute, final determination shall be made by the Board of
Adjustment.
Wilderness-Recreation Zone (WR-1)
^
P u r ? o s e ' ^ € WR-1 Wilderness-Recreation Zone is established for the
purpose of providing homesites without disturbing the natural wilderness
setting, the wildlife therein, and agricultural uses on adjacent properties
(2) Characteristics. This zone is characterized by mountains, valleys,
uneven terrain, livestock grazing, and occasional dwellings in a wilderness
setting.
(3)

Lot Requirements for Building Purposes.

(4)

Authorized Uses.

(5)

Special Provisions.

See Section 12.19.

See Section 12.20.

(a) Vegetative Clearance. All high flammable vegetation shall be
removed from the area surrounding flammable buildings. Extent of the
removal required shall be determined by the Zoning Administrator. In
case of dispute, final determination shall be made by the Board of
Adjustment.
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12.18 E Snyderville Basin D i s t r i c t - SBD-1
(1) Purpose. The SBD-1 zoning d i s t r i c t i s designed as a single "Code"
consisting of planning p o l i c i e s and development regulations wherein
development proposals are considered on their individual merits. As with
other approaches to planning zoning t h i s zone promotes the public health,
safety and welfare by maximizing the positive impacts of development and
minimizing the negative.
(2) Characteristics. This zone i s characterized by an innovative approach
to planning and development approvals in that a permit to develop i s
granted or denied on the basis of a proposals conpliance with pre-set
performance standards (policies) covering a wide range of s o c i a l , economic,
environmental, design and public f a c i l i t i e s factors. Processing and final
decision on a development application focus on the developers
"evidentiary package" which consists of: an application form, plans,
drawings and rendering, and one-page evidentiary forms for each policy, and
coupleted by the developer.
(3) Lot Requirements for Building Purposes. See Snyderville Basin
Development Code Chapter 5, Policy, Section 5.6 Absolute P o l i c i e s , Section
5.7 Relative P o l i c i e s , Section 5.9 Density, and Table 6.
(4) Authorized Uses. See the Snyderville Basin Development Code Chapter 5,
Policy, Section 5.6, Section 5.7.
(5) Special Provisions,
(a) Permits required. A Class I or Class I I development permit i s
required for a l l developments in the Sndyerville Basin Zoning D i s t r i c t .
(b) Lot size, frontage width, front, side & rear setbacks and
authorized uses. Due to the uniqueness of t h i s development approva1
process, requirements for Section 12.19 and 12.20 will be obtained
from the standards contained in Chapter 5 and Table 6 of the
Snyderville Basin Development Code.
12.19

Lot Requirements for Building Purpose.

Refer to table of page 12-5 b # c.

12.20 Authorized Uses in Zones. In the following table permitted uses cf
lands or building are indicated by a "P", conditional uses of lands or
buildings are indicated by a "C", and if the use i s not allowed i t i s either
not named in the use l i s t or i t i s indicated by a "_"* See authorized use table
on page 12.9.
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12.20

Authorised Uee<

(1)

Accessory buildings and uses customarily
incidental to permitted and traditional
uses.

(2)

Agriculture

SR-1

RR-1

RR-2

R-l

R-5

AC-1

WR-1

WF-1

C-l

A. The raising, cultivating, grazing,
or breeding of plants or animals in
unlimited quantities.
B. Animals and fowl for recreation
or for family food production for the
primary use of persons residing on
the premises.
C. Agriculture industries or businesses involving agricultural production in manufacturing, packaging,
treatment, sales, intensive feeding,
or storage, including animal feed
yards, kennels, fur farms, food
packaging or processing plants,
commercial greenhouses, commercial
poultry or egg production, saw mills,
and similar uses.
(3)

Dwellings
A. Single Family Dwellings

P

P

P

P

B. Two Family Dwellings

C

C

C

C

C. Multiple Family Dwellings in
Planned Unit Developments

P

D. Multiple unit dwellings for
commercial purposes, i.e., motels,
hotels, condomin imiitns, and boarding
houses, providing that the density
ol units with kitchen facilities shall
not exceed ten (10) per acre and units

P
P

CR-1

HS-1

LI-1

without kitchen facilities, thirty (30)
per acre, unless it can be shown that
adequate fire protection is provided
to safeguard human life to justify a
greater height than permitted in Section
5.6 of this Code; in such cases densities
may be increased, provided however that
the density shall not exceed the above
described densities for each two building
levels above fire fighting grade.

SR-1
-

RR-1
-

RR-2

R-l

R-5

AC-1
-

WR-1

WF-1

C-l
p

E. Multiple unit dwellings for commercial purposes, i.e., hotels, motels,
and condominiums, with no density requirements, provided however that at
least seventy (70) percent of the project, excluding parking space and road
rights-of-way, is maintained as natural
or landscaped ope? space or outdoor
recreation facilities, i.e., swimming
pools, tennis courts, etc.

HS-1
P

LI

P

F. Mobile Homes on one acre minimum lots
(but in no case less than the minimum lot
size required in the zone) and subject to
requirements of Chapter 10.

-

G. Mobile homes for housing agricultural employees and subject to
the requirements of Chapter 10.

-

H. Mobile home parks and subdivisions
subject to requirements of Chapter 10.

C

I. Recreation vehicle parks subject
to requirements of Chapter 9.

CR-1
P

P

C

p

p

p

C

-

C

C

C

C
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p

-

-

C

C

p

p

-

C

C

C

-

-

-

C

c

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

C

C

C

-

C

-

C

J. Farm or ranch housing for employees
of the farm or ranch.
)

Outdoor commercial recreation activities including archery and rifle ranges,
campgrounds, golf courses, dude ranches,
public 8t«ble69 ski lifts, public snowmobile trails, and other similar uses,

)

Sales Activities
A. Retail establishments such as
grocery and general merchandise stores
and novelty, gift, and photo supply
stores v
D. Service establishments, including
barber shops, confectionary shops,
laundromats and dry cleaners, indoor
recreation centers, mortuary, home
appliance repair shops, banks, and
other similar commerce.
C. Travel service and entertainment
establishments such as automobile
service stations, restaurants, drivein food stands, and theatres.
D. Office buildings, including clinics,
animal hospitals, and other office
activities.
E. Liquor and beer sales and places
for the drinking of liquor and beer.
K. Neighborhood convenience stores
for ihr primary us*1 of the residents
in l he immediate vicinity.

SR-1

RR-1

RR-2

R-l

R-5

AG-1

WR-1

WF-1

C-l

CR-1

HS-1

LI-1

(7) Private Service Activities
A.

C

C

C

C

C

C

-

-

P

B. Private educational institution
having a curriculum similar to public
schools and approved by the state,

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

-

P

C. Private institution or organization
recreational grounds and facilities, not
open to the general public and to which
no admission charge is made.

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

D.

Child day care or nursery

Rest or convalescent homes

C

E. Private parks, recreational grounds
recreational camps or resorts, including
accessory or supporting dwellings or
dwelling complexes and commercial service
uses which are owned or managed by the
recreational fa* ility to which they are
accessory,

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

C

P

C

C

-

C

C

C

C

P

18) Public or Quasi Public Service Activities
A. Power generation plants, dams and
reservoirs, transmitting stations and
substations, and television satallite
stations.
B. Hospitals, medical clinics, cemeteries, and churches,

c,

C

C

C

C

P

P

C

C

c

c

c

c

c

c

c

-

p

c

c

c

C.

Public buildings

P

p

p

p

p

p

p

-

p

p

p

p

U.

Parks

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

c

p

p

p

p

9) Processing and Manufacturing
/v. Quarries, grovel pits, open pit
mines, and tunnel mines.
li. oil wells, natural gas wells,
and steam we I 1s

12.21

Determination as to Uses Not Listed

Determination as to the classification of uses not specifically listed in
Section 12.20 of this Code shall be made by the Planning Commission. The
procedure shall be as follows:
(1) Written Request: A written request for such determination shall
be filed with the Zoning Administrator. The request shall include a detailed
description of the proposed use and such other information as may be required.
(2) Determination. The Planning Commission shall compare the
nature and characteristics of the proposed use with those of uses specifically
listed in this Code, and make a determination of the classification of the
proposed use. The determination shall be rendered in writing within thirty
(30) days after filing. A determination approving the proposed use shall
state the zone classification in which the proposed use will be permitted,
whether the use is a permitted or conditional use, and shall include fir.cir.gs
which establish that such use is of the same character as uses permitted in
that zone classification.
(3) Appeals. Any person shall have the right to appeal the decision
cf the Planning Commission to the Board of Commissioners by filing an appeal
with the County Clerk within thirty (30) days of the Planning commission's
action stating the reasons for said appeal and requesting a hearing before
the Board of Commissioners at its next regular meeting.
(A) Effect. The determination and all information pertaining thereto
shall become a permanent public record in the office of the Zoning Administrator.
Such use shall thereafter become a permitted or conditional use in the class
or district specified in the determination, and shall have the same status
as a permitted or conditional use specifically named in the regulation for
that zone classification.
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